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Security of energy supply in the new Europe 
 
– a role for the European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy? 
 
Abstract 
 
External energy relations are essential components of both the European Union 
(EU)’s search for an overall energy strategy (EPE) and the development of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In this article questions are posed about the 
role for the use of nuclear technology as the means of meeting some of the objectives 
of both areas of policy. As both the EPE and the ENP are dependent on the 
negotiation of international agreements with third parties for their effectiveness the 
focus of analysis presented will be on the EU’s legal and constitutional framework for 
action and in particular the EURATOM Treaty which established the European 
Atomic Energy Community in 1957.  
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DCT    Draft Constitutional Treaty  
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ENP2  Ukraine and Armenia – ENP states which produce nuclear 
electricity   
EP   European Parliament 
EPE   Energy Policy for Europe 
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EU   European Union 
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INSC    Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation 
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including Russia 
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TECSC Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community 
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Security of energy supply in the new Europe 
 
– A role for the European Atomic Energy Community in  the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy? 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU)’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched by 
the European Commission in March 2003 (CEC 2003b) and followed by the formal 
adoption of a Strategy Paper in May 2004. (CEC 2004a) The objective of the 
Neighbourhood Policy was to achieve a framework for partnership and co-operation 
amongst states in the arc of instability on its eastern, south-eastern and southern 
peripheries.TPD1DPT Through the opening of access to the EU’s Internal Market and 
increased economic co-operation it was hoped to promote security, stability and 
prosperity in the wider European region. For some of these states in the eastern region 
(especially for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and to lesser degree for Armenia) 
there is an ambition to eventually accede to the EU. Acceptance that this ambition is 
unlikely to be achieved in the short to medium term has increased the support for the 
development of the ENP in the Eastern European states.  
 
Accession is not the objective of the bilateral agreements being established under the 
umbrella of ENP policy between the EU and the ENP states. The agreements are 
however framed as a result of the experience the EU has in the use of conditionality in 
the 2004/7 accession process. The Country Strategies for each of the ENP states 
outline conditions for access to the benefits of the internal market agreed between the 
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EU and each state. The EU’s positive leverage through this conditionality approach 
comes from the financial support TPD2DPT and the other benefits including access to the 
internal market given on the basis of the extent to which the objectives of the plans 
are achieved.  
 
An inevitable consequence of the deepening of the dialogue with the ENP states lying 
to the east is that the EU must engage in more structured dialogue with Russia which 
considers that the eastern states are states of its near abroad. The development of a 
more assertive foreign policy by Russia during the leadership of Vladimir Putin had 
increased the difficulties encountered establishing this dialogue. As has the fact that 
some in Russia have gone so far as to declare that the EU has no legitimate interest in 
the ENP states. Emerson et al (2007:8) warn of the necessity of bearing this in mind 
in ENP developments and of the need for the EU to ‘…persuade Russia that its 
national interest lies in a co-operative rather than coercive approach to the common 
neighbourhood.’  
 
Driving the urgency of engaging in dialogue with the ENP states and Russia for the 
EU is the high level of import dependency for energy resources which the Member 
States have on energy supplies from Russia. The interdependency generated by the 
energy trade offers advantages to all parties but has resulted in a complex pattern of 
agreements, many of which are made on a bilateral basis between the parties. The 
result is a fragile triangular partnership in which two parties, the EU and Russia, are 
competing for influence over the same ENP states (c.f. Figure 1. Europe’s triangle of 
competing partners (the case of energy co-operation).  The former Soviet states of 
Security of energy supply in the new Europe –EAEC and ENP 11
Eastern Europe are looking for a reason to turn to support from the EU to act as a 
counter-weight to pressure from Russia. 
 
Figure 1 Europe’s triangle of competing partners (the case of energy co-
operation)  
 
 
 
Many of these agreements in the field of energy co-operation focus on the trade in oil 
and natural gas but in this article attention is turned to development of co-operation on   
the production of electricity by nuclear technology. For the EU states the use of 
nuclear technology to generate electricity is a highly controversial issue and very 
different national policies have been adopted towards its use. All the EU states are 
signatories of the EURATOM Treaty which established the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC) in 1957.  In this article questions are posed about the role which 
the EAEC, and the competences established for it in the EURATOM Treaty, may play 
in the development of energy security in the wider Europe.  
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Energy security may be defined as the ability to secure access to secure and 
sustainable energy resources. The ideal would be for those resources to be indigenous 
and large-scale so that a country is able to respond to current demands and have 
confidence in it’s independence from other countries for future energy needs. But this 
is not possible in the interdependent world. As Gideon Rachman commented in an 
article in the Financial Times ‘…calls for energy independence are all but universal.’ 
(Rachman 2008) Energy security i.e. the ability to access secure and sustainable 
energy resources is now central to the foreign policies of the United States, the 
emerging Asian economies and the EU.  
 
The launch of the Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) in 2007 outlined the EU’s strategy 
to access secure and sustainable energy resources, emphasising the importance to this 
objective of the development of a more coherent approach to external energy policy. 
(CEC 2007a) European Commissioner Benito Ferrero-Waldner (Commissioner for 
External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) identified the required 
objectives of such a policy as  ‘…addressing our ability to maintain basic supplies and 
service, (including energy, (specifically) …diversifying our sources of supply, our 
transit routes and our internal energy mix...addressing energy security in our political 
dialogues with all external partners; discussing and taking action to protect critical 
infrastructure and diversify supply routes and building on the memorandum of 
understanding we have already signed with countries like Azerbaijan, Egypt, 
Turkmenistan and Jordan (ENP states).’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2008)  
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The analysis presented in this article demonstrates the ways in which the EURATOM 
Treaty offers an opportunity for the EU to act as a single entity, concluding 
agreements with the Russia and the ENP states to achieve a number of objectives 
including some with regard to aspects of safety in the nuclear sector, accountability of 
nuclear materials to ensure they are not diverted to military usage, combating 
trafficking of nuclear materials and technology transfer and co-operation. (CEC 
2006b:17) TPD3DPT In the absence of changes being made to its terms or legal status it is 
argued that the EURATOM Treaty strengthens the available policy instruments of 
energy dialogue and co-operation within the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. TPD4DPT 
 
Weaving a web of agreements 
 
The power of the EU to conclude agreements on energy co-operation is undermined 
by the high degree of fragmentation of instruments and objectives which characterises 
EU Energy Policy overall. National interests remain strong in the arena of energy 
policy measures and national governments jealously guard their competences as the 
appropriate bodies to determine their own national energy policy structures. Despite a 
number of developments during 2006 and 2007 (e.g. the emphasis on the international 
dimension given to European Energy Policy (CEC 2006a:4), inclusion of a clause on 
energy solidarity in the Lisbon Treaty the impact of the fragmentation in the internal 
operation of Energy Policy remains and is an obstacle to establishing a more coherent 
External Energy Policy.  
 
Amongst the legal and constitutional tools which the EU has in its portfolio of 
instruments to achieve energy security in the wider Europe is the EURATOM Treaty. 
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The Treaty has remained substantively unchanged since it was adopted in 1957. It 
may be repealed or amended at any time. But this would require the unanimous vote 
of all the signatory states and the political willingness to undertake revision of the 
EURATOM Treaty does not currently appear to be evident amongst the EU’s national 
governments. Despite much criticism of its longevity and out dated emphasis on 
support for a single industrial sector the EURATOM Treaty thus continues to retain a 
separate legal personality from that of the European Union Treaty. 
 
 The Treaty was more difficult to negotiate in 1956 than its proponents had 
anticipated because of difference in national nuclear energy policies that had already 
emerged (for detailed discussion see European Parliament 2002).  Although the 
political and socio-economic environments within which the nuclear sector is 
operating in 2008 have altered, national nuclear energy policies which are highly 
divergent remain in place. As the author of this article has argued elsewhere, recent 
opportunities to amend or repeal the Treaty were not taken. (Barnes 2007) This would 
suggest that it would be difficult to negotiate a Treaty in which the signatories agreed 
to co-operation on the peaceful, civilian use of nuclear technology today, for different 
reasons from the difficulties encountered in 1957, but nonetheless because of difficult 
to reconcile national nuclear energy policies.  So the question of what value the 
EURATOM Treaty has in the development of the actions of the Neighbourhood 
Policy must be addressed. 
 
The Neighbourhood Policy is based on the EU adopting a role as a normative foreign 
policy actor and exporting through its exercise of soft power instruments the norms of 
European integration. TPD5DPT In the wider European region the norms of energy co-
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operation are seen as improved security of access to energy supply, enhancement of 
competition, environmental protection, increased energy efficiency and development 
of renewable energy resources. The main tool which the EU has at its disposal to 
achieve its energy policy commitments is the liberalisation of market and the 
opportunities of transfer of energy resources on integrated transmission systems.  
Increased connectivity between the energy markets of the EU, the ENP states and 
Russia and the development of infrastructures for transfer of energy (including 
electricity) are vital components of the co-operation. Electricity is a potentially 
tradeable commodity within the enlarged internal market being created as a result of 
the agreements with the ENP states. It is not possible to differentiate the generating 
source of electricity on an electricity transmission network. De facto the opening of 
the internal market for electricity has increased the need for co-operation in the 
nuclear sector with those ENP states which are generating nuclear electricity (Ukraine 
and Armenia) and with Russia.  
 
Nuclear energy co-operation is also founded on the commitments made by the EAEC 
on behalf of the EU states, the EU’s Member States acting separately, Russia and the 
ENP states, also acting separately, to adhere to the safety principles of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)TPD6DPT which form the basis of the 
International Convention on Nuclear Safety. TPD7DPT The objective of this Convention is to 
legally bind the signatory states producing nuclear electricity to maintain a high level 
of safety at the power plants. Reports on the implementation of the necessary 
measures are subject to peer review at meetings of the IAEA. As the EAEC is a 
signatory to the Convention the European Commission has the requisite competences 
to provide these reports on behalf of the EU. The issues addressed in the Convention 
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include ensuring that there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the general 
public and site personnel from the operation of nuclear installations, including nuclear 
power plants, research reactors, parts of the nuclear fuel cycle and related 
infrastructure.  
 
EURATOM –  
an appropriate legal and constitutional basis for action in the wider European 
region? 
 
The EAEC was established to provide the conditions for the development of nuclear 
energy in Europe by sharing the resources required (financial, materials, technical and 
expertise). Specifically it was to provide protection of the workers in the industry and 
the general public and to enable agreements to be developed with third parties and 
international organizations on issues relating to supply and peaceful use of the 
technology. Exclusive Community competence for action focused on eight main areas 
which were outlined in Article 2 EURATOM, with prominence being given to safety 
of the workers in the industry and the public in the areas surrounding the nuclear 
power plants. TPD8DPT 
 
These limitations on the competences given to the EAEC, including the lack of 
competence for the safety of the nuclear installations themselves, were the result of 
the powerful national interests that had resulted in the development of differing 
national nuclear policies in the 1950s. Two factors played a role in the reluctance of 
the Member States of the EAEC during the negotiations of 1956/1957 to open up the 
nuclear sector. One was the link between the use of nuclear technology for electricity 
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generation and the evolving nuclear weapons technology. Both energy and military 
strategic competences were and continue to be considered by national governments as 
vital aspects of national security interests. At the same time strong national 
commercial interests were evolving in the electronuclear sector and the Treaty 
negotiations were constrained by concerns by the national industry (particularly that 
of France) that commercial information would have to be revealed in order to ensure 
enforceable nuclear safety regulations by the EAEC. (EP 2002) 
 
Despite changes to the political and socio-economic environments in which the 
electronuclear industry is operating the EURATOM Treaty has remained an element 
of the acquis which all EU states must adopt on their accession to the EU.  As such 
the Treaty encompasses a group of signatory states with national nuclear policies as 
diverse as that of Austria (anti-nuclear) and France, Finland, Lithuania and Bulgaria 
(supporting new reactor developments) to present a unified approach when dealing 
with aspects of external nuclear energy policy (see Barnes P.M. (2006), Foggatt A 
(2007) for more detailed discussion of the differences in national nuclear energy 
policies).  
 
It may be that the seeming resilience and longevity of the Treaty is because it “…(is) 
a remarkable document that expresses the essential commitments of the parties in a 
flexible and forward-looking language”. TPD9DPT (CEC 2002a:7) It may be because it is a 
very specific Treaty supporting on an area of energy generation which appeared, 
particularly in the late 1980s and 1990s following the Chernobyl disaster, to be no 
longer relevant in the energy debate. Alternatively the longevity of the Treaty may 
result from the fact that those negotiating Treaty changes are often more concerned 
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with reform of the institutional frameworks which support the operation of the EU as 
a whole rather than one specific aspect of energy policy. TPD10DPT Particularly as such 
negotiations would relate to a technology as controversial and divisive within the EU 
as the nuclear energy technology. Irrespective of the explanation, the Treaty remains. 
As such it is an instrument which the EU has at its disposal to use to support the 
developments of the frameworks of action with the ENP states and Russia.  
 
The utility of the Treaty has been demonstrated in the interpretation and application 
its terms throughout the history of the EAEC. Measures have been developed to 
improve the safety standards for the industry, monitoring of the use of nuclear 
materials, commitment to nuclear weapons non-proliferation and research into new 
aspects of the nuclear technology for commercial use. All the EU’s nuclear generating 
states use safety standards based on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. These are standards which have been developed on 
the basis of international experience in nuclear safety since the 1950s.  Safety of the 
nuclear installations themselves remains a competence of the national authorities of 
the nuclear generating states of the EU.  
 
The safety regimes in place at the nuclear installations have evolved in independent 
ways in the differing national contexts because this competence was not transferred to 
the EAEC. But, at the same time a non-binding acquis has been developed within the 
EU combining and harmonising national practices on safety. TPD11DPT In addition to this 
harmonisation of national practices a number of legislative acts based on the legal 
framework of the EURATOM Treaty have been adopted all of which do have an 
indirect impact on installation safety. (Barnes 2003) As a result by the beginning of 
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the 2000s the European Commission confidently concluded that the EU has the most 
effective safety regime and system of control of nuclear materials in the world. (CEC 
2002d) A conclusion, that appears to have been substantiated, by the close co-
operation which has been achieved between the EAEC and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) on the safeguarding of nuclear materials. TPD12DPT  
 
In recognition of the growing urgency to address problems relating to nuclear de-
commissioning and safety of nuclear reactors, particularly in the light of enlargement 
to Central and Eastern European states (CEC 2002d) the European Commission 
proposals for a package for measures to address these concerns were put forward in 
2003 (CEC 2003a) on the basis of the EURATOM Treaty. Despite amendments being 
made to the proposals (CEC 2004b) they remained un-adopted in 2008. But safety of 
the electronuclear industry sector has been identified as of high priority in the 
development of the EU’s energy policy, both within the EU and in its relations with 
other states. At EU level the Heads of Government of the Member States have 
declared that the role of the EU  should be ‘…to develop further, in conformity with 
Community law, the most advanced framework for nuclear energy in those Member 
States that choose nuclear power, meeting the highest standards of safety, security and 
non-proliferation as required by the EURATOM Treaty …’. (Brussels Council March 
2007:para.32) And as ‘…nuclear power also raises important issues regarding waste 
and decommissioning so nuclear waste management and decommissioning should 
also be included in future Community work. The EU should also continue their efforts 
to ensure that such standards are observed internationally.’ (CEC 2007a:17) 
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Support for the development of nuclear industry in the EAEC was based on the 
EURATOM Treaty provision for funding for research and development of nuclear 
fission technology (Article 7 EURATOM). This support for the EURATOM research 
programmes has continued throughout the history of the EAEC, the most recent being 
included in the Seventh Framework RTD programme (FP7) proposed by the 
European Commission 2007-213. Agreement on the budget for the EURATOM 
Research Programme 2007-2011 TPD13DPT was difficult to achieve because of the divergent 
views of the national governments about further developments in nuclear fission 
technology. Eventually agreement was reached in the Council of Ministers on July 
24 Pth P 2006 with the bulk of available funding being directed to new fusion technology 
developments and limited amounts for de-commissioning of fission technology. TPD14DPT  
 
Of the total budget for EURATOM research of 2.7 billion euros, 2.1 billion are to be 
allocated to fusion research and in particular the development of the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) which is under the auspices of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). TPD15DPT The agreement for the ITER  
development in Cadarache, France, was signed on 21Pst P November 2006 and will 
include input from the EU27, represented by the EAEC, Russia, Japan, China, India, 
South Korea and the United States. The ITER development is regarded by many as 
having the potential to make a major contribution to sustainable and secure energy 
supplies in Europe. (Critics such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) on the other hand point 
out that it is unlikely to be at the stage of commercial production before 2050 because 
of the difficulties of achieving and maintaining the high temperatures needed for the 
reaction to take place. In the view of FoE it will take too long and require a very large 
investment which could be used in the development of other energy technologies.)  
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Further financial support for the evolving European nuclear industry came when a 
lending instrument was established in 1977 empowering the European Commission to 
issue EURATOM loans for the purpose of contributing to the costs of construction of 
nuclear power stations. (Council Decision, 77/270 EURATOM).  In the period 
between 1977 and 1987 90 new build projects in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and 
the UK were partially financed through this loan facility. However as concerns about 
the safety of the nuclear industry grew in the late 1980s following the Chernobyl 
disaster no applications were made for new projects by the nuclear states of the EU 12 
and all loans had been repaid by 2000. 
 
Although no loans were authorized from 1987 in 1994 the scope of the EURATOM 
lending facility was extended. (Council Decision, 94/179 EURATOM) The 
Commission was authorized to contract EURATOM borrowings in order to finance 
improvements in safety and efficiency of non-EU member states – specifically 
targeting Former Soviet Union (FSU) states likely to be amongst the first to apply for 
membership of the EU, and also Ukraine. In particular ‘… the Commission is 
empowered to contract, borrowings the proceeds of which will be allocated in the 
form of loans to finance projects to increase the safety and efficiency of the nuclear 
power stations of the non-member states…(projects must relate)… to nuclear power 
stations or installations in the nuclear fuel cycle which are in service, or under 
destruction or to the dismantling of installations where modification cannot be 
justified in technical or economic terms.’ (CEC 2002c:2)  
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Using this facility EURATOM loans were provided for improvements to safety 
standards and/ or construction to the Bulgarian government (in 2000 for Kozlduy 5 
and 6 reactor units, 12.5 million euros), Romania (in 2004 for Cernovoda 2, 223.5 
million euros) and to Ukraine (in 2004 Khmelnitzky 2 and Rovno 4 units, 83 million 
euros). (2002c:18) TPD16DPT Articles 41-44 EURATOM Treaty require notification to be 
made to the European Commission of any new reactor developments within the EU.   
A favourable opinion is then required from the Commission on the provisions made 
by the national governments of finance to meet de-commissioning costs and funds for 
the management of radioactive waste. By complying with these requirements in 2007 
in preparation for the construction of a new reactor unit at the Belene site, the 
Bulgarian government became the first member state of the EU to be eligible for a 
EURATOM loan since 1987.  
 
Criticisms of the EURATOM Treaty may be made on the grounds that developed as it 
was in the context of the highly regulated and subsidised energy sector of the 1950s it 
is based on an outmoded paradigm of state support for a sector of energy production. 
Svein Andersen in a study of the liberalization of the gas market points to the way in 
which the energy policy paradigm underpinning EU action has changed since the 
1950s from a traditional model of energy developments by public bodies supported by 
long term state investment and subsidies to one of market functionality. (Andersen 
2000) There is still a considerable element of state involvement in the contemporary 
energy sector but the focus is now on the creation of liberalized power markets in 
which all modes of electricity generation should be competitive without state support. 
As the EU 27 is faced with the energy reality of increasing dependency on imported 
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energy resources the primary tools which are available to respond to this challenge are 
those of the market.  
 
Any subsidies given to energy developments may be seen in terms of unfair 
advantage for that particular technology over other aspects of the energy sector.  The 
creation of the European internal market for energy requires an underpinning of a 
level-playing field for all electricity producers. Electricity, as product from all 
generation sources, is a tradeable commodity which may be moved both within the 
integrated European energy market and as a commodity for export trade outside the 
EU. EU competition legislation applies to nuclear electricity as a commodity available 
for trade. Legislation to liberalize the EU’s national markets in electricity and thus 
reduce prices for domestic, commercial and industrial users, based on the TEC, 
applies to electronuclear production. 
 
Here lies the problem for the EU in dealing with nuclear energy. The EURATOM 
Treaty provides a framework for collaborative action that includes support for high 
levels of state intervention to assist the development of nuclear energy technology. 
The economic viability of the electronuclear industry remains contested. As does the 
question of appropriateness of offering state support for the use of technology which 
requires a high level of capital investment in the construction phases in an 
increasingly liberalised and privatised energy sector. From the viewpoint of the 
contemporary electronuclear industry itself however it has been ‘…demonstrated that 
nuclear power does not, over the long term, require subsidy.’ World Nuclear 
Association (WNA) (2005:10). A situation acknowledged by the European 
Commission ‘...if you would like to build a nuclear power station it is an investment-
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based decision without state aid. We are not in a situation where we should provide 
state aid for the nuclear industry ...’ (Piebalgs, 2006) However in the view of the 
European Renewable Energy Federation and Greenpeace when they launched their 
challenge to the funding arrangements for the new reactor development at the 
Okiluoto site in Finland state aid in the form of export credits and loans at special 
rates to the companies involved are indeed examples of state subsidies to the nuclear 
sector. (Greenpeace, Press Release 26/09/2007) TPD17DPT  
 
The creation of the European Atomic Energy Community was not a commitment by 
the national governments of the six signatory states to any form of co-operation on the 
military use of nuclear technology in 1957.  The political realities of the 1950s Treaty 
negotiations were dominated by the reluctance of the national governments of the EU 
to proceed with strategic and military integration in a context other than the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The underlying political philosophy for the 
creation of the EAEC was a search for peaceful co-operation, not collaboration so that 
weapons of war could be developed. Not all the EU’s Member States had developed 
or were intending to develop nuclear weapons capability in the 1950s. As it remains 
an element of the EU’s acquis the EURATOM Treaty is one of two treaties which 
have an impact on the approach to nuclear non proliferation which is adopted by the 
EU 27 – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1Pst P July 1968) (NPT) being the other. 
Both contain measures and statutes on safeguards of materials. All the NPT signatory 
states (those which are nuclear weapons states and those which have agreed to 
exclusively peaceful uses of the technology) have voluntary agreements and protocols 
with the IAEA for inspection to ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted to 
military use. TPD18DPT 
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The EURATOM Treaty transferred competences to the EAEC to ensure that the 
fissile materials being used in the nuclear reactors of the EAEC were only being used 
for peaceful purposes. The EURATOM Safeguards Office (ESO) was established to 
ensure all EU states did not divert or acquire materials away from their intended and 
declared uses (Chapter VII EURATOM). (The ESO is now based under the 
supervision of the Commission (DG TREN) and is considered to have more robust 
mechanisms in place and a much clearer current role and mandate than the 
EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA.) TPD19DPT The EAEC is thus a party to the agreements 
which have facilitated the co-ordination of it’s role with that of the IAEA in the 
monitoring of the terms of the NPT within the EU. For some of the supporters of the 
EURATOM Treaty it is this competence which has created a ‘…firewall against 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, through the elements of ownership of fissile 
material and nuclear safeguards …(which) was and is its main success (of the 
Treaty).’ (Linkohr 2007) 
 
 
Reluctance to repeal the EURATOM Treaty 
 
Recent criticisms have been made that the EURATOM Treaty is ‘…an undemocratic, 
outdated alien in the world of the liberalized market’. (Fouquet 2005) These criticisms 
are NOT based on the Treaty competence in managing and developing aspects of 
safety in the electro-nuclear industry, an aspect of nuclear energy policy which many 
policy makers and members of the general public feel should be subject to a stringent 
legislative framework. Rather they are made on the basis of the lack of involvement 
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of the European Parliament TPD20DPT in the decision making process of the EAEC and the 
high level of state support for an aspect of the energy sector as the European energy 
market becomes more open to liberalization and de-regulation. As one of the founding 
Treaties of the European Union the EURATOM Treaty was included in the list of 
Treaties to be reviewed as outlined in the Laeken Declaration, 2001. (Laeken Council,  
December 2001) Whilst several options, including repeal of the Treaty, were possible 
discussion of the EURATOM Treaty was limited within the context of the 
Convention’s debates.  
 
The main argument for this appeared to be that the Praesidium of the Convention 
regarded the Treaty as a distinct, complex and technical subject which it was not 
appropriate for the Convention to consider. (Secretariat of the European Convention 
2003) As a result the EURATOM Treaty was retained instead as a Protocol annexed 
to the Draft Constitutional Treaty (DCT). A declaration was however appended to the 
Constitutional Treaty, (signed by Germany, Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden) 
noting that the Treaty had been unchanged since its adoption in 1957 and supporting 
an Intergovernmental Conference to review its terms as soon as possible. (Declaration 
44, DCT)  
 
Failure by all the Member States of the EU to ratify the Constitutional Treaty created 
a difficult period of reflection and then negotiation on alternatives amongst the 
national governments which concluded with the introduction of a draft Reform Treaty 
TPD
21
DPT by the German presidency in 2007, being ratified in 2008. At the same time during 
2006 and 2007 the European Union engaged in a search for an Energy Strategy which 
would ensure that secure, competitive and sustainable energy for the EU. 
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Commitments to energy solidarity and action to curb climate change were included in 
a more explicit manner in the Lisbon Treaty proposals than such commitments have 
been to date in the Treaties. The outcome of these debates was for the EURATOM 
Treaty to be maintained in a Protocol as proposed in the DCT, thus leaving its 
separate legal personality unaltered. The question of an early IGC to review the 
Treaty was not addressed by the Heads of Government meeting to sign the Reform 
Treaty in Lisbon.  
 
Despite the commitments to energy solidarity the Lisbon Treaty confirms that the 
supranational competences with regard to the energy sector are still to be limited.  
Measures in the field of energy will be taken by the ordinary legislative procedures 
with qualified majority voting in the Council and co-decision in the European 
Parliament. This should not affect the rights of Member States to decide on the choice 
of energy resources and the structure of their national energy industries. Decisions 
which significantly affect a Member State’s energy choices and the general structure 
of national energy supply remain subject to unanimity vote. It would thus appear that 
the Lisbon Treaty is proposing little change to the decision-making process which 
underpins the development of energy policy and measures in the EU.  
 
The manner in which the national governments of the EU have decided to continue to 
guard their rights to choose their national energy resources demonstrates how little 
room there is for bargaining and consensus building between the national 
governments about future nuclear energy policy development. At the Brussels 
Council in 2007 it was clearly stated that the Energy Policy for Europe will pursue 
three objectives, fully respecting the Member States’ choice of energy mix and 
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sovereignty over primary energy resources. (Brussels Council, March 2007) In the EU 
some states are more heavily dependent on the sector than others some states are in 
the process of developing new reactors, reconsidering new nuclear build whilst others 
with no-nuclear policies nevertheless import electricity from states which are nuclear 
electricity producers. As such agreement would be difficult to achieve on regulation 
of an energy resource and technology which is regarded as unsafe by many amongst 
the electorates of the EU’s Member States. The EURATOM Treaty does provide a 
legal framework for action which might not be provided if the Treaty was subject to 
re-negotiation for amendment or repeal. From a practical perspective the impact of 
failures to ensure safe operation of the industry in the geographical area of the EU and 
its neighbouring states could result in major environmental consequences including 
damage to human health and life. Politically it is unacceptable for the decisions made 
about one country’s energy policy to carry with it the potential to significantly affect 
another country’s environment or population.  
 
As the search for a competitive, secure and sustainable energy policy intensifies not 
just in the EU but globally the importance of maintaining a diversified electricity 
sector is apparent and it is in that context that the nuclear energy option is gaining in 
support. (WEC 2007) Richard Youngs in his analysis of the EU’s external energy 
policy highlights how firmly the EU’s energy policy is grounded in the internal 
market and its effective operation. In the external dimension the approach to energy 
security is thus focused on spreading the internal market rules to the east and south of 
the EU. (Youngs 2007) The objectives of some EU states (such as Bulgaria) and those 
of the ENP (Ukraine) are to participate in trade of electricity, irrespective of the 
technology by which it is produced. Therefore ‘...care should be taken to ensure that 
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the development of trade does not in the medium term lead to the placing on the 
(Market) of electricity produced in nuclear power stations whose safety is not 
guaranteed...’. (CEC 2002d:74) The presumption being that the EU would not wish to 
encourage the maintenance and longevity of nuclear reactors which are located in the 
wider European region and contributing to the integrated electricity market but are 
palpably unsafe and should be closed. 
 
The EURATOM Treaty – a new role for an old instrument? 
 
The European Union is heavily dependent on imported supplies of the fossil fuels 
needed to meet its growing energy demand. Solidarity amongst the Member States on 
energy measures appears to offer the most effective way forward to meet the 
challenges the EU 27 faces, but the rhetoric of the national governments does not 
match their action and protection of national interests continues as a constraint to 
proposed strategies. In March 2006 the European Commission launched a debate 
about how the European Union was to achieve the competitive, sustainable and secure 
energy policy which is required for the future. (CEC 2006a)  
 
Whilst there is agreement within the EU that energy usage and its impact on climate 
change should lead to the development of low or if possible carbon free economies 
there is debate about the most effective mechanisms to achieve this goal. No 
technology used for electricity generation currently is carbon free. It would appear 
that the renewable technologies, which are less carbon producing than the fossil fuels, 
are not yet able to match the growing demand for energy. The use of the nuclear 
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energy option in national energy policies is gaining support globally, TPD22DPT not just in 
some European states (c.f. 1. Table  Numbers of reactors in operation and planned).  
Security of energy supply in the new Europe –EAEC and ENP 31
Annex 1 Reactors by Member and Candidate State (to summer 2007) 
 
 % of national 
electricity 
produced by the 
nuclear sector 
Number of operable 
reactors 
Reactors under 
construction 
Reactors 
planned and 
proposed 
Belgium  55 7   
UK 19 23   
Finland 26 4  1  
France 78 59  2 
Netherlands 4 1   
Spain 23 9   
Sweden 52 10   
Germany 32 17   
Czech Rep 41 6  2 
Hungary 34 4   
Lithuania (1) 72 1  1* 
Slovakia 55 6  2 
Slovenia (2) 39 1   
Bulgaria 44 4  2 
Romania 8 1 1 3 
Croatia  (with Slovenia)   
Turkey (3)  0  3/5 
EU 27 + 
candidates 
 152 2 11 
World (4)  442 28 204  
Source: various European Commission and IAEA. (cited in Barnes 2008). 
 
Notes  
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(1)Lithuania,  planned new nuclear power plant with Latvia, Estonia and Poland 
(2)Croatia, no nuclear power plant of its own but Croatian national electricity company has co-
ownership of plant at Krsko in Slovenia 
(3)Turkey, accession to the EU estimated by 2020 
(4) 68 of the global total of planned reactors are in China 
 
Nuclear electricity requires high levels of capital investment to be made at the 
construction phase but once in operation has low marginal operating costs and an 
ability to run most economically at very high load factors thus meeting the demand 
for volume base-load electricity. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 2006 World 
Energy report concluded ‘...new nuclear power plants could produce electricity at a 
cost of less than 5 US cents per kWh if construction and operating risks are 
appropriately managed by the plant vendors and power companies. At this cost 
nuclear power would be cheaper than gas-base electricity...(but) more expensive that 
conventional coal-fired plants...(but) the breakeven cost of nuclear power would be 
lower when CO2 prices are taken into account.’ (cited in CEC 2006c:12) 
 
Within the EU inability to meet demand with alternative sources was a major factor in 
the decision of French and Finnish governments in the period 2005-2007 to 
commission new reactors. It has been the driving force behind the decision of the 
Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Polish governments to enter into discussion for a 
joint project to build a new reactor at the Ignalina site in Lithuania. The favourable 
opinion of the European Commission for the construction of a new reactor at the 
Bulgarian Belene nuclear power plant in December 2007 was to meet demand 
following the de-commissioning of other Bulgarian reactors in preparation for 
accession. The debate about nuclear electricity has also been re-opened in other EU 
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states such as Germany, Italy and the UK. For the ENP2 states Ukraine meets 48% of 
its electricity needs from its nuclear reactors, Armenia 42% and these high levels of 
dependency make it difficult for these states to find alternatives. Both states have 
plans in place for new reactor construction to replace reactors which are being de-
commissioned.  
 
The European Energy Policy (CEC 2007a) contains an outline of plans which would 
achieve the aims of increasing the security of energy supply, ensuring the 
competitiveness of European economies and the availability of energy and at the same 
time promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change. This 
Action Plan was accepted by the European Council and accompanied by some 
ambitious targets to achieve curbs in greenhouse gas emissions the European Council 
‘…emphasizes that the EU is committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-
efficient and low greenhouse gas emitting economy’. (CEC 2007a: Annex 1) Whilst 
the contribution nuclear electricity may make to the development of a low carbon 
economy is contested, the European Commission in presenting this strategy for future 
energy policy considered that nuclear power was the least carbon-producing energy 
source after offshore wind power and small-scale hydropower. (CEC 2007a:18) 
 
It is acknowledged in the EPE Action Plan that no single element of policy provides 
all the answers and that energy policy must be addressed by many different policy 
areas. As a consequence of the changing acceptance of the nuclear sector, its 
increased economic viability, continued safety concerns and developments of the 
EU’s technological lead in this field certain conclusions were drawn in the EPE. 
‘Recalling that the EPE will fully respect Member States’ choice of energy mix the 
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European Council notes the Commission’s assessment of the contribution of nuclear 
energy in meeting the growing concerns about safety of energy supply and CO2 
emissions reductions while ensuring that nuclear safety and security are paramount in 
the decision-making process, confirms that it is for each and every Member State to 
decide whether to rely on nuclear energy and stresses that this has to be done while 
further improving nuclear safety and the management of radioactive waste….’. (CEC 
2007a:para 11) 
 
The EURATOM Treaty as an element of the EU’s energy acquis which all states 
accept on their accession includes the statement that ‘…only joint effort undertaken 
without delay can offer the prospect of achievements commensurate with the creative 
capacities of their countries …’ (Treaty Preamble). This statement implies a 
commitment (which has not been repealed) to solidarity on aspects of developments 
relating to the nuclear sector. The EURATOM Treaty thus give the EU the 
competence ‘….to develop further, in conformity with Community law, the most 
advanced framework for nuclear energy in those Member States that choose nuclear 
power, meeting the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation as 
required by the EURATOM Treaty….’.(CEC 2007a:Annex 1)  
 
The EU’s safety regime is based on the 25 safety principles of the IAEA which are 
also the basis of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. There is overlap but 
not duplication in the work of the IAEA and the European Commission on nuclear 
safety and safeguards on nuclear materials. The European Commission and the IAEA 
work in close collaboration on the development of these standards. In order to avoid 
duplication of effort within the EU the IAEA procedures are invoked to verify the 
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EU’s procedures but not to replace what the EU is already doing. This is in 
recognition of the fact that through the European Safeguards Agency the EU states 
have in place a more comprehensive and effectively monitored system in place than 
the IAEA is able to achieve.   
 
Although the role of the European Court of Justice is limited in the competences 
awarded by the EURATOM treaty the legislative acts and measures which are in 
place have been supported by rulings of the European Court of Justice. In aspects of 
the EU’s nuclear regulation (e.g. transport of waste) the implementation mechanisms 
of the TEC may be applied. In the IAEA’s monitoring through inspection of nuclear 
power plants in non-EU countries the issues of non-compliance with safety standards 
are harder to determine. Extending the EU’s safety regimes and competences to co-
operation with Armenia and Ukraine through the ENP policy will thus bring positive 
benefits.  
 
 
The value-added of the EURATOM Treaty in the European Neighbourhood  
 
The value-added of the EURATOM Treaty as an instrument to address problems of 
safety in the operation of the nuclear industry both within the EU and in states in the 
European neighbourhood was first demonstrated in the early 1990s. The catalyst for 
the EU to take action outside its borders on nuclear safety came from two interlinked 
events. The first was the catastrophic events at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 
the Ukraine in April 1986 and the second was the interest shown in accession to the 
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EU by states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). TPD23DPT The action taken then has produced 
the model of action to be used in the ENP2 Action Plans. 
 
Despite incidents such as the melt down of part of the core of reactor unit 2 at the 
Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant in USA in 1979 TPD24DPT a spirit of 
complacency about the safe operation of Western Europe’s reactors had developed by 
the 1980s. This complacency was shattered in 1986 by the devastation wrought by the 
explosion and fire at in the Soviet designed reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant. Fall-out from the Chernobyl explosion was detected across the whole EU 
including the UK and Scandinavia, where it remains a problem today. It demonstrated 
very clearly how dependent the states of Europe are on one another to deal 
appropriately with nuclear safety in the wider European region. Admittedly the 
reactors in Western Europe had been built to different designs from those of the 
Soviet designed technology used at Chernobyl, but the widespread nature of the 
devastation undermined levels of support and confidence in the nuclear industry 
overall. It caused a re-think in some Member States of the EU, for example in Italy 
where reactor developments had been pioneered in the early 1960s. In November 
1987 the outcome of a referendum held in Italy was to halt all new reactor 
construction programmes and initiate a programme of de-commissioning of existing 
reactors from 1990. (The Italian government reversed this policy in May 2008 and 
announced the development of an action plan to resume nuclear reactor development 
within 5 years.) 
 
When meeting in Munich in 1992 the leaders of the G7 countries TPD25DPT commissioned a 
study of nuclear safety at nuclear power installations in Central and Eastern Europe 
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and the countries of the FSU because of the widespread concerns about the safety of 
Soviet design reactors. Particular attention was paid at the G7 summit to developing a 
programme of action which would include support for the enhancement of regulatory 
regimes for improvements of the operational safety of plants, alongside the closure or 
up-grading of those plants with the most serious problems. These proposals were 
accompanied by calls for funding from the World Bank and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the completion of an International 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. (G7 Summit Communique, 1992) 
 
The EU Heads of Government concluded that it was appropriate for the EU to take a 
lead role in the international efforts to ensure the safety of the Soviet design reactors 
because of the proximity of the states where these reactors were located.  A Council 
Regulation published in July 1992 emphasised the importance of intensifying the 
harmonisation of the safety measures within the EU. At the same time a commitment 
was made to intensify co-operation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Republics of the former Soviet Union in order to bring the levels of safety in their 
nuclear reactors to those of the EU’s states. (Council Resolution OJ C 172, 
08.07.1992) Following from this as the states of Central and Eastern Europe made 
their applications for membership of the EU the Commission was given the mandate, 
based on its EURATOM Treaty competences, to undertake careful monitoring and 
review of their Russian technology nuclear reactors. 
 
The overall objective of the work undertaken by the European Commission was to 
bring the accession states to a level of nuclear safety compatible with that of the EU’s 
Member States. Analysis was prepared by the European Commission and included in 
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the initial evaluation of the applicant states which was presented to the European 
Council in 1997. (CEC 1997) By the Cologne Summit of June 1999 a two-pronged 
approach to dealing with the safety at the Soviet design reactors had been developed 
by the European Commission. Firstly remedial short term action was to be undertaken 
at the reactors with the most serious problems and secondly the longer term safety 
considerations would result in closure of the unsafe reactors, modernisation of others 
and a commitment to a search for alternatives to nuclear generated electricity. 
 
For the new Member States the reactor closures were deeply controversial. There is a 
high dependency on nuclear electricity in the new Member States as a domestic 
source of energy which will reduce their reliance on imports of Russian energy 
resources and its attempts as a result to retain influence in these states.  However 
closure programmes have been carried out, supported by EU funding and new reactor 
developments are planned (for example in 2006 the governments of Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania and Poland signed an agreement for the construction of a new reactor at the 
Ignalina power plant, replacing a unit closed in preparation for EU accession) and 
others proceeding to construction. 
 
The mandate given to the European Commission in the EURATOM Treaty to work in 
this field provided the basis of a coherent approach from the EU’s Member States. 
The European Commission officials were brought into direct collaboration with the 
nuclear authorities of the accession states in order to ensure that appropriate 
regulatory authorities were established. This was before the states (Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania) using nuclear 
electricity had acceded to the EU. Agreements on funding, including access to the 
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EURATOM loan facility, from the European Union to support the closure and 
upgrading of reactors in the accession states were also initiated. It is this approach of 
technical assistance and financial support which has been adopted within the ENP 
framework of energy co-operation for the EU and the ENP2. 
 
Financial support comes in the form of loans and grants. In 1991 the TACIS Nuclear 
safety programme TPD26DPT was introduced with a total budget of 721 million euros 
(including 100 million for the Chernobyl shelter fund) and PHARE TPD27DPT funding of 192 
million euros for the same period. As a result 950 projects were financed, 300 under 
PHARE, 650 under TACIS. (CEC 2006c) In 2007 this funding was replaced by the 
Instrument for Nuclear Co-operation (INSC)) with provisions to finance nuclear 
safety co-operation in the ENP2.TPD28DPT The need for available funds for future reactor 
developments upgrades and modernisation of existing plants and de-commissioning 
of ageing reactors within the EU’s Central and Eastern European States, the ENP2 
states and Russia, however remains.   
 
EURATOM loans (cf. above) are not disbursed from EU’s budgetary funds but are 
funded on the financial market. There is no subsidy from the Commission or the 
EAEC associated with EURATOM loans. But they are the only international financial 
instrument providing unrestricted long term funds for nuclear projects.  EURATOM 
loans can only finance up to 50% of the investments needed, and therefore require 
involvement of complementary financial sources, such as:  
 
• In EU member states: internal cash flow of the operator, financial market, 
banks, European Investment Bank (EIB). 
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• In non-member states: the state concerned, the EBRD (only available for 
closure of reactors), internal cash-flow of the operator, financial market, 
banks, export credit agencies.   
 
The period of highest levels of financing for nuclear electricity generation by the EIB 
was between the 1960s and 1980s when 6.6 billion euros was lent for investments for 
nuclear power stations, experimental facilities and facilities relating to the nuclear fuel 
cycle in France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and Italy. In a similar fashion to the fall 
in applications for funding through EURATOM loans during the 1990s and early 
2000s few requests were made to the EIB for financing of nuclear electricity projects. 
In 2007 the EIB reviewed it’s policy with regard to energy related projects in the light 
of the adoption of the EPE. The EIB’s Corporate Operational Plan for 2007-2009 
included five energy related priorities- renewable energy; energy efficiency; research 
development and innovation in energy; security and diversification of internal supply 
(including the trans-European networks); energy security and economic development 
in neighbourhood and partner countries. (EIB 2007) As nuclear sector projects raise 
very specific issues of safety and requirements for de-commissioning funding the EIB 
require notification to the Commission under the terms of Article 41 EURATOM as 
an essential pre-requisite before a loan is authorised. The EIB also carries out 
economic, technical, environmental and financial assessments of all projects and 
ensures that they are fully consistent with EU and national law and policies.  
 
In December 2007 the European Commission gave the required favourable opinion to 
the new nuclear power plant at Belene, Bulgaria (IP/07/1874, Brussels December 6Pth P 
2007) in accordance with articles 41-44 EURATOM notification of new 
Security of energy supply in the new Europe –EAEC and ENP 41
developments. The favourable opinion followed discussions between the European 
Commission and the Bulgarian government about financing of future de-
commissioning at the proposed reactor and safety at the installation. It is estimated 
that a ERATOM loan facility of 300 million euros will be authorised in addition to 
financing from the EIB. (European Atomic Forum 2008)  The first of the two units at 
the new plant is expected to begin operation in 2011 and the second in 2013. The new 
power plant is intended to replace lost capacity from the closure of reactor units at the 
Kozloduy plant, which was a condition of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. In addition 
the objective of the new reactor development is also to enable Bulgaria to become an 
electricity exporting state. 
 
A number of controversies had surrounded the proposal for the new Belene reactor. 
The project is an initiative of the Natsionalna Elekricheska Kompania of Bulgaria 
(which will hold 51% stake in the investment) and is based on a design developed by 
Atomstroyexport JSC of Russia (a company in which the state owned Gazprom has an 
interest). Atomstroyexport will act as the main contractor with Areva NP (France) and 
Siemens (Germany) as the main sub-contractors. Concerns were raised that this would 
in essence be Soviet designed technology and would not meet the standards of safety 
required within the EU. However the reactors are to be Russian design but their 
operational systems will be supplied by Areva and Siemens. In addition although a 
single  regulatory safety design standard does not exist for EU as a whole the project 
met the European Utility Requirements for Light Water Reactors TPD29DPT (which is also the 
basis for the development at the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear reactor unit in Finland). 
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The agreement on this contract, which includes Russian input, is a demonstration of 
the continued influence of Russia in Bulgaria, now an EU state. It was one of a 
package of energy contracts agreed between Russia and Bulgaria in January 2008 
including co-operation on the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline which is 
valued at more than 10 billion euros. The conclusion of this package of energy 
contracts between Russia and Bulgaria demonstrates two realities of the energy 
challenges being faced within the wider European region. Firstly the levels of energy 
interdependency which exists and the interaction between the energy utilities which 
are involved in the sector and secondly how difficult it is for the EU to establish a 
common external energy policy when member states engage in bilateral agreements 
with a third party. 
 
Co-operation with Russia in the European Neighbourhood 
 
The co-operative approach to dealing with nuclear safety issues with Russia and with 
Russian support to deal with nuclear safety issues in the wider European region has 
evolved since the mid-1990s. This is evidenced in the meetings of the G8 states and 
since 2000 in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. At the G8 Summit held in Moscow in 
April 1996 Russia joined the G7 States in publishing a declaration on Nuclear Safety 
and Security. The emphasis in this declaration was on international collaborative 
action to promote a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. It provided the grounding 
for increased collaboration and co-operation on nuclear related issues between the 
EU, the other states of the wider European region, for which accession is not an 
option in the short term but a longer term perspective, and also Russia.  
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The G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada (2002) agreed to establish a G8 Nuclear 
Safety and Security Group which reported back at the 2007 Summit in 
Helligendamm, Germany. The objective of the report was to ‘…develop a common 
understanding of internationally acceptable safety and security levels in the fields of 
nuclear installations, radioactive sources, decommissioning, radioactive waste and 
spent fuel management facilities in order to benchmark …national practices.’ Support 
for the Ukrainian government to convert the damaged reactor unit at Chernobyl to a 
safe condition and for the Armenian government’s closure and de-commissioning of 
the Medzamor nuclear power plant were highlighted in the report. The EURATOM 
Treaty provides the legal and constitutional framework for the EU states as a group in 
the implementation of measures relating to these commitments.  
 
The main tool of foreign policy which the EU has at its disposal is the prospect of 
accession. Requirements to close or up-grade reactors in the accession states were 
included in conditions for membership introduced to exert influence on states prior to 
their accession in 2004/7. The interdependencies between the EU 27 and ENP in the 
field of energy demonstrate the desirability for the EU of establishing a common legal 
framework in the field of energy with ENP states. In December 2006 the European 
Commission concluded that the ENP policy had achieved good results and become 
the established vehicle for co-operation across a wide range of issues but made 
proposals for more effective action. (CEC 2006b:8) In presenting proposals for 
increasing the effectiveness of the ENP the European Commission reiterated the 
commitment to largely bilateral agreements in order to reflect the specific needs of the 
states of the EU’s Neighbourhood. But a number of cross-cutting themes were also 
identified with  energy co-operation as being one of the most important where the EU 
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and ENP states share common interests and which could be usefully addressed in a 
multilateral context. Indeed the interdependencies which exist in the wider European 
region and with Russia on aspects of energy co-operation raise this as an issue of 
importance in all agreements made between the triangle of partners – EU 27, ENP 
states and Russia.   
 
Of the two current nuclear generating states of the ENP the Ukraine is the most 
significant strategically. It occupies a geographical location between Poland, Romania 
and Moldova in the west, Belarus in the north and Russia in the east. As a result of 
this location it is in the eastern region of Ukraine that Russian influence is most 
evident. Russia has not been slow to use energy as a weapon to maintain its influence 
in Ukraine (demonstrated in January 2006 when Gazprom the state controlled Russian 
company cut gas supplies to Ukraine, causing a reduction in gas supplies in some EU 
states and again in January 2008 when similar action was threatened). Co-operation in 
the area of nuclear safety between the EU and Ukraine began in the early 1990s and 
by 1998 304.3 million euros had been given through the EUs’ TACIS programme for 
nuclear safety, funds for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Ukrainian G7 Action 
Plan. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established in 1997 to implement the Shelter 
Implementation Plan and to restore the damaged unit 4 at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant to an environmentally safe status. The total cost of this Plan is $US 1 
billion and overall the EU has been the largest contributor to the Fund. In addition 
EURATOM Loans were also provided to Ukraine for upgrading and modernising 
reactor units at the Khmelnitsiy and Rovno nuclear power plants.  
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In October 2005 the European Union signed the Energy Community South-East 
Europe Treaty (ECSEE) with a number of Balkan states which came into force on 
July 1Pst P 2006. Ukraine has observer status to the Energy Community but with the 
expectation of full membership in Treaty in 2008. The primary objective of the 
Energy Community is to establish a single regulatory framework for trading energy 
across south-east Europe and the EU on the same terms. In order to do this it entails 
the signatory states adopting the acquis of the EU in the fields of energy (including 
the EURATOM Treaty), environment and competition. If Ukraine accedes to the 
ECSEE Treaty then the co-operation on nuclear safety will have a clear and firm legal 
basis.  
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on co-operation in the field of energy 
between the EU and Ukraine was signed during the EU-Ukraine summit in Kiev in 
December 2005.  It formed the basis of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument between the EU and the Ukraine on energy co-operation. Two of the four 
identified areas of energy co-operation were nuclear safety of the operating Ukrainian 
nuclear power plants (subject to the competences discussed in this article) and the 
integration of the electricity market (subject to the terms of the TEC). Included in the 
MoU was an agreement for a safety evaluation in the Ukrainian nuclear reactors to be 
undertaken by the end of 2006. The MoU with Ukraine shows the relevance of the 
EURATOM Treaty to energy co-operation between Ukraine and the EU as it is under 
its terms that co-operation on nuclear safety, control of nuclear fusion, controls on 
trade in nuclear materials TPD30DPT  and fuel cycle services, prevention of illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials, pursuit of nuclear research and technology development have been 
included in agreement.  
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For Armenia, where the prospect of EU accession is an ambition but a more distant 
prospect than for Ukraine, participation in the ENP is a mechanism by which the 
regional isolation of the state and lack of economic development may be addressed. 
(Armenian average per capita GDP was only $US 1,523 in 2005, EU 27 $US 32,900 
(2007)) Tensions remain within the Southern Caucasus over the status of the region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations over the recognition 
of the Armenian Genocide during World War I. As a result of these tensions the 
borders of Armenia with Azerbaijan and Turkey have remained closed and there has 
been a consequent impact on the Armenian economy. In the early 1990s war broke 
out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
Although there has been a cease-fire since 1994 security in the region is an issue of 
grave concern for both Armenia and the EU.  
 
A major focus in the EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan is co-operation on a peaceful 
resolution to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh in line with the strategic objectives of 
the EU’s Security Strategy. (CEC 2003c) The prospect of accession by Turkey to the 
EU has increased the tensions between Armenia and Turkey over the recognition of 
the Armenian genocide. Although it is not an official EU policy, many states of the 
EU have supported the arguments of Armenia that events in the region during World 
War I which led to the death of 1.5 million Armenians through Turkish actions should 
be recognised as a case of genocide. This is not a view accepted by Turkey.   
 
Of the three states of the Southern Caucasus Armenia has the closest links to Russia 
in the energy sector. There is a high level of dependency on imported supplies of 
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energy from Russia and vulnerability in particular to gas pricing disputes. Armenian 
government plans to diversify its energy sector to overcome the insecurity this action 
brings to the Armenian economy have been delayed by continued Russian influence 
and involvement in the energy sector. This in turn has led to increased levels of 
support for developments in energy co-operation under the umbrella of ENP action 
from the Armenian government. However there appears to be an impasse currently 
over the closure of the Medzamor nuclear power plant which involves the three 
parties - Armenia, the EU and Russia.  
 
A major element of the EU-Armenia ENP plan is co-operation to close the Medzamor 
Nuclear Power Plant. This is a first generation Soviet designed nuclear power plant 
built in an area of seismic activity. It was identified as a dangerous nuclear power 
plant in the 1990s and became the target of international (see above on the Nuclear 
Safety and Security Group report at the 2007 G8 Summit in Helligendamm). However 
as the plant provides 42% of Armenia’s electricity the Armenia government has 
pointed out to the EU that ‘…energy capacities must take account of the future 
expected needs of the Armenia, the need to strengthen energy security and the need to 
offset the closure of the Medzamor plant.’ (CEC 2005:2) 
 
Bilateral dialogue on the Medzamor plant has been part of EU-Armenia co-operation 
since the early 2000s. In 2001 the EU offered to organise a conference of parties to 
create a fund to finance alternative energy capacity in Armenia, offering to provide 
100 million euros of assistance if a date could be agreed on closure of Medzamor. The 
EU view continues to be that the plant cannot be upgraded to internationally 
recognized standards at a reasonable cost and provides support for nuclear safety 
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assistance at the plant.  The Armenian government view is that closure of the plant 
will proceed before 2016 if an alternative source of electricity can be found. However 
as this commitment is associated with a plan to build a new reactor at the same plant, 
which will not only provide domestic electricity but enable export of electricity to 
take place, the concerns raised by the EU about safety of the new reactor because of 
its location in a zone of seismic activity remain. The Medzamor Plant is owned by the 
Armenian Ministry for Energy but is financially managed as the result of a debt 
settlement agreement for unpaid deliveries of nuclear fuels by Russia’s United Energy 
Systems, an arrangement which is due to finish in 2008. But it is unlikely that the 
Armenia government will be able to proceed on the new reactor development without 
further involvement of Russian capital. 
 
Russia is continuing to use the weapon of energy in its relationship with Armenia in 
other projects e.g. the investment of 250 million euros in 2006 by Russia in the 
construction of the Thermo Power Plant V on the Hadrzan River. Instead of 
transferring capital for this investment gas tariffs will be maintained at a level of 55 
euros instead of 110 euros as with other Russian trading partners. Armenia is almost 
completely dependent on imported energy. It does not have any coal production, oil or 
gas fields. The only source of domestic primary energy – electricity - comes from the 
thermo power plants of the Hadrzan River or the Medzamor nuclear power plant. For 
a state such as Armenia where the per capita GDP is one of the lowest in Europe and 
which is highly dependent on imported energy the attraction of such an arrangement 
is clear and maintains the close relationship which the state has with Russia. Despite 
the fact that almost 40% of Armenia’s export trade and 30% of its import trade is with 
the European Union.  
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Furthermore the gas transmission and distribution system of Armenia is owned and 
operated by Armrosgazprom which is a joint venture of the Russian owned Gazprom 
and Itera utilities and the Armenian state which has a 45% holding. The Armenian 
electricity distribution network is privatised with a British company Midland 
Resources Holding being the major shareholder. Of the generation plants 60% have 
been transferred into private ownership or Russia ownership to offset government 
debts. (Energy Charter Secretariat (2004:11)) As a result of the high dependence on 
imported energy and desire of the Armenian government to secure supply from 
diversified energy sources an important element of Armenian energy policy is to 
liberalise the electricity market and integrate into regional markets. Integration into 
the EU energy market through the ENP action plans provides an important counter-
balance to the influence Russia is able to exert.  
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Conclusions 
 
As a result of the energy interdependencies in the region there are arguments that co-
operation should be enhanced by all parties the EU 27, the ENP states and Russia. 
However Javier Solana has warned that in the energy sector ‘…there is a justified 
concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future 
leverage than in future production. Contrast Gazprom’s spending spree abroad with 
the lack of investment and waste at home…..(Furthermore) It is up to us to avoid the 
kind of fragmented bilateral negotiations which leave us all worse off. A more united 
and comprehensive approach would enhance our bargaining position.’ (Solana 2008) 
A recognition that unlike Russia the EU is not a major source of energy, but rather is 
reliant on Russia as a mainstay of its own energy imports. So what leverage can the 
EU bring to bear on the neighbouring states if it does not award the prize of accession 
in the short term?  
 
The European Union has developed a new mechanism to extend its influence within 
the wider European region. The frameworks created in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy which was launched in 2003 marked a different approach from 
the EU to co-operation with states on the eastern and southern borders. The purpose 
was to deepen the co-operation between the EU and these states to enhance stability 
and security in the wider European region with states which may or may not have the 
ambition to accede to the EU in the future. At the same time the ENP is not a 
mechanism to undermine that ambition. In the arena of energy co-operation the ENP 
utilises the main instrument of EU Energy Policy – that of access and integration to 
the energy market. In the arena of nuclear energy co-operation the instrument being 
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utilised for joint action by the EU 27 is the EURATOM Treaty. The EURATOM 
Treaty has remained substantively unchanged throughout the history of the EU. It 
provides the competences for the EU to respond to co-operation on safe operation of 
nuclear reactors, safeguards on the management of nuclear materials to ensure their 
use for peaceful and not military purposes and safe management of waste in the wider 
European Region.  
 
In the wider European region the EU and Russia are competing for influence in the 
ENP states but have differing approaches and tools. The high levels of energy 
interdependencies of all parties in this triangular partnership would suggest that there 
are advantages for all in maintaining a co-operative approach to one another in the 
European region. This requires two considerations to be taken into account by the EU. 
The first is the need to balance its response to the needs of the regional co-operation 
with an awareness of the pressures on Russia to maintain its influence in the region. 
The second consideration is that as the EU does not yet have a coherent external 
energy policy urgent action must be taken in order to develop one.  
 
The efficacy of the EURATOM Treaty as an external policy instrument to deal with 
issues of nuclear safety and safeguards of nuclear materials was demonstrated during 
the 1990s and early 2000s in states in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the goal 
for these states was accession to the EU the co-operative approach supported by 
financial aid and technical assistance to upgrade and modernise reactors proved the 
success of the use of the competences of the Treaty and the expertise of the European 
Commission to effect changes in states before they became members of the EU. As an 
external foreign policy tool the EURATOM Treaty provides the EU with an 
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opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the nuclear generating states of its 
Neighbourhood – Armenia and Ukraine - to deal with issues of nuclear safety and the 
safeguard of nuclear materials.  It is for this reason that this article has argued that 
there is a role for the EAEC and its founding Treaty in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.  
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Endnotes 
 
TP
1
PT The European Neighbourhood Policy states - Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.  
 
TP
2
PT In 2007 the European Neighourhood Partnership Instrument (EPNI) replaced the 
TACIS and MEDA funds for the period 2007-2013 and with a budget of 11.2 billion 
euros, increasing the available funds for the ENP states by 32% from the previous 
budgetary  period of 2000-2006. Of the EPNI Budget 494 million euros was allocated 
to projects in the Ukraine between 2007-2010 and 98.4 million euros to Armenia for 
2007-2013. 
 
TP
3
PT Identified in 2006 by the European Commission as a group of nuclear issues of 
common interest where increased multilateral action would enable the ENP states and 
the EU to respond to more effectively in the wider regional context. A commitment 
was also made to enhanced dialogue with ENP partners planning to use nuclear 
energy in the future. (2006b:17) 
 
TP
4
PT Two ENP states are currently users of nuclear electricity – Ukraine and Armenia as 
is Russia. New reactor development is planned in all three states. Ukraine is also one 
of the world’s uranium mining countries. In the discussion which follows the 
abbreviation ENP2 will be used to refer to Ukraine and Armenia together.  
 
TP
5
PT Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as the ability to be able to get others to want what 
you want by co-opting rather than coercing them. It relies on attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals and policies and in large part arises from the values 
and norms which are held within a country.  The attraction of these is what 
encourages others to acquiesce or imitate them. 
 
TP
6
PT The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent international 
organization reporting to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the 
United Nations. It was established as an autonomous agency by the United Nations on  
29Pth P July 1957, as the world’s Atoms for Peace Organisation, IAEA Statute, Article 2. 
‘The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, 
that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose’. 
 
TP
7
PT International Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted June 1994, opened for 
signatures on 20Pth P September 1994, entered into force 24Pth P October 1996. The EAEC 
acceded to the Convention in 1999.  By 2007 the Convention’s  signatory states  
numbered 65, including all 31 states with operating nuclear power plants globally 
 
TP
8
PT In order to perform its task, the Community shall, as provided in this Treaty:- 
  
a) promote research and ensure the dissemination of technical information; 
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b) establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the 
general public and ensure that they are applied; 
c) facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the 
part of undertakings, the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the 
development of nuclear energy in the Community; 
d) ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of 
ores and nuclear fuels; 
e) make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted 
to purposes other than those for which they are intended; 
f) exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile 
materials; 
g) ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the 
creation of a common market in specialised materials and equipment, by the free 
movement of capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy and by freedom 
of employment for specialists within the Community; 
h) establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as 
will foster progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
(Article 2 EURATOM) 
 
 
TP
9
PT In 2002 a High Level Expert Group was established to report on the effectiveness of 
the ESO as the terms of the EURATOM Treaty had not been revised since 1957. The 
findings of the Group were that the ESO should remain the focus of EU wide controls 
for both practical and legal reasons. ‘The EURATOM Treaty being a remarkable 
document that expresses the essential commitments of the parties in a flexible and 
forward-looking language’. (CEC 2002:7). 
 
TP
10
PT My thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for reminding me of 
the realities of the negotiating process within the EU.  
 
TP
11
PT Also supporting the development of the voluntary harmonisation of national 
practices is the work of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association 
(WENRA) established in 1999 by the regulatory authorities of the EU and 
Switzerland to build a network of   European states to determine a common approach 
to safety and develop an independent capability to examine nuclear safety in the 
applicant states of the EU. In 2008 the regulatory authorities of 17 European states 
were parties to this association.  
 
TP
12
PT Co-operation based originally on a Cooperation Agreement between the EAEC and 
the IAEA 75/780/EURATOM, OJ L 329, 23.12.1975 p 28-29, strengthened in a joint 
statement by Commission President Barroso and Director-General of the IAEA Dr. El 
Baradei in May 2008, IP/08/719, Brussels 07.05.2008 
 
TP
13
PT Although included in the FP7 the budgetary line for EURATOM actions remained 
separate and for a shorter period of time than other funding for research projects, but a 
facility was agreed to extend the EURATOM funding for an additional two years to 
ensure that the budgetary lines were synergous with one another. 
 
TP
14
PT Nuclear fusion – is the process of fusing two hydrogen atoms to form a single atom 
of helium. One gramme of the fuel produced can develop the same energy as 45 
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barrels of oil. However the process requires extremely high temperatures which it is 
not yet possible to achieve in a reactor. 
 
TP
15
PT The total funding package of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and 
Technology Development was more than 50 billion euros for the time period 2007-
2013. The EURATOM Budget as a separate budgetary line included 2.7 billion euros 
for the period 2007-2011 with the possibility for an extension of funding to for the 
period to 2013. Energy technology research was identified as one of the co-operative 
themes in the overall budget with 2.3 billion euros allocated to new energy technology 
developments particularly renewable energies. A difference in funding that led 
environmentalists to express concern that the nuclear technologies were receiving 
unjustifiable levels of support which would divert attention from the development of 
renewable technologies.  
 
TP
16
PT At the time these loans were agreed with the Bulgarian and Romanian governments 
neither state was a member state of the EU.  
 
TP
17
PT Subsidies for the nuclear industry are also the subject of much controversy in the 
US which has 104 operating reactors and plans expected to be made for up to 27 new 
reactor developments in the next two years. (Economist September 6Pth P 2007) The US 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Pub L. 109-058) includes provisions for grants of up t $2 
billion in insurance against regulatory delays and lawsuits for the first six reactors to 
receive licences and begin construction. It extends a law limiting a utility’s liability to 
$ 10 billion in the event of an accident and provides a tax credit of 1.8 cents per kWh 
for the first 6,000 MW generated by new plants. The Act also guarantees for an 
indeterminate amount of loans to fund new nuclear reactors and other types of power 
plant using ‘innovative technology’.  
 
TP
18
PT France and the UK of the 189 signatory states of the NPT are declared Nuclear 
Weapons States (the others being the USA, Russia and China). Some NATO 
countries, the EU Member States of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, 
Greece and the applicant state of Turkey, have forces which are trained to use US 
nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan and Israel are known to have nuclear weapons and 
have not signed the NPT and North Korea is now withdrawn.  
 
TP
19
PT The EU is highly dependent on imported uranium supplies and the European Supply 
Agency was established in 1960 as a procurement agency. It was concluded in 2002 
that the Supply Agency exists, ‘...but is a mere shadow of what was intended.’ 
European Parliament (2002:xiii) In 2006 the ESA had only 17 employees but as the 
price for uranium ore rises on the world market its future role may arguably increase. 
 
TP
20
PT The European Parliamentarians have argued for a stronger role in the areas covered 
by the EURATOM Treaty as ‘… (I)t can be plausibly argued that it is precisely in 
these areas ….. relating to safety that the public most feels the need for rigorous 
democratic scrutiny, control and accountability’ (EP 2002:2). Support for increasing 
the EP’s role in the EURATOM Treaty also came during the deliberations of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. In the so-called ‘Penelope paper’ which was 
prepared a by task force led by Francois Lamoureux, Director General DG TREN 
proposals for changes to the EURATOM Treaty included support for the extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting and co-decision to nuclear energy policy. (CEC 2002e) 
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The objective of the proposals being to bring the EP into the decision making process 
including the power adopt laws with the Council for basic standards of nuclear safety. 
A view which has continued to be represented within DG TREN of the European 
Commission ‘… the first - and most important in many ways would be to give the EP 
a greater role rather than just a consultative one. Make more decisions, co-decisions 
with qualified majority voting for more issues’ Official of DG TREN in 
correspondence with author, July 2005.  
 
 
TP
21
PT Signed by the Heads of Government in October 2007 in Lisbon when it adopted the 
name of the city in which it was signed and has since come to be known as the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
 
TP
22
PT World Energy Council (2007:Introduction) ‘To meet energy demand of all 
households worldwide, energy supplies must double by 2050’ with policy makers 
being prepared to keep all options on the table. Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050 
World Energy Council, November 2007, WEC website 
HTUhttp://www.worldenergy.org/publicationsUTH.  
 
TP
23
PT Date of applications from the former Soviet States – Hungary 31/3/1994, Czech 
Rep. 17/1/1996, Poland 5/4/1994,  Slovenia 10/6/1996, Romania 22/6/1995, 
Slovakia 27/6/1995, Cyprus 4/7/1990, ,Latvia 13/10/1995 , Malta  16/7/1990 , 
Estonia 24/11/1995, Lithuania 8/12/1995,Bulgaria 14/12/1995 
 
TP
24
PT Whilst it was felt that the TMI incident had been contained within the power plant 
itself in 1979 it was nevertheless considered to be serious enough for 30,000 people 
living in the local area to be screened for the effects of radiation until 1997. The clean 
up of the damaged reactor took 12 years at a cost of US $973 million. 
 
TP
25
PT G7 Informal grouping of leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, 
USA and the EU represented under current institutional structures by President of the 
European Commission and the Head of Government of the Member State holding the 
rotating presidency at the time of the summit meeting. When the Russian Federation  
began to participate at these summits in 1998 the group assumed the title G8. 
 
TP
26
PT TACIS is the instrument established to provide financed technical assistance to 
states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including Armenia, Russia and Ukraine in 
1991. It was initiated as a ‘stand-alone’ programme but has become an instrument of 
the more strategic approach being developed by the EU towards these states. 
 
TP
27
PT PHARE (Pologne, Hongrei, Assistance a la Reconstruction Economique) set up in 
July 1989, initially to support the transition of Poland and Hungary to democracy and 
market economies and then widened to encompass all the Central and Eastern 
European states. 
 
TP
28
PT The Instrument for Nuclear Co-operation ( INSC) was established by Council 
Regulation EURATOM 300/2007 on nuclear safety co-operation, February 19PthP 2007, 
published in the OJ L 22.03.2007, 81/1, with a budget allocated of  524 million euros 
for the period 2007-2013. It replaced the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme. 
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TP
29
PT EUR European Utility Requirements for Light Water Reactors – this is a common set of 
requirements agreed by the major European utilities for Light Water reactors at nuclear power 
plants. They were developed as a result of a project begun in 1991 to promote the 
harmonisation of the safety approaches, equipment specification and standards and the 
information needed for the assessment of safety in LWRs.  Amongst the utilities which are 
parties to the EUR agreements are British Fuel (UK), EdF (France) and Rosenergoatom 
(Russia).  
 
TP
30
PT An issue which has gained in importance as supplies of uranium have become more 
expensive (the price of uranium ore had trebled on the world markets in 2007) and 
Ukraine is a supplier of uranium. 
